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Abstract 
Key conceptual elements for the analysis of enterprise finance and financial interme-
diaries are discussed. Some methodological issues relevant to the study of the demand and 
supply of financial services for enterprises are addressed. 
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AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKl/ 
by 
Carlos E. Cuevas 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Among all developing country groups, Sub-Saharan Africa showed the poorest 
performance of gross domestic investment, the lowest growth rate of the industry sector, and 
the second lowest growth rate of manufacture in the last decade (Table 1). The 
contribution of industry to gross domestic product (GDP) in the Sub-Sahara region grew 
from 20 percent to only 27 percent in the quarter-century after independence. Manufacture, 
included in the industry sector, increased its contribution to GDP from 8 percent to 11 
percent during this period, a share still by far the lowest among developing countries (Table 
2). 
The weak performance suggested by the figures above is observed in spite of 
substantial inflows of external assistance to the region. While disbursements of official 
development assistance went from 9 billion in 1985 to 14 billion in 1988 and 13 billion in 
1989, gross domestic investment remained at about 25 billion dollars per year during this 
time period (Table 3). Severe crowding out by the government in the allocation of external 
assistance appears to have limited capital accumulation in the region. While aggregate GDP 
decreased between 1980 and 1989 in the region, general government consumption increased 
1/ The views contained in this paper are those of the author and do not represent The 
World Bank or its affiliated institutions. 
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at an annual growth rate of 1.1 percent in this period, representing 14 percent of GDP in 
1989, the highest share among all developing country groups. Private consumption growth 
averaged only 0. 7 percent per year in the same decade while gross domestic investment 
decreased at 3.9 percent per year. 
The allocation distortions suggested above have been compounded by flawed and 
inefficient mechanisms used to support real sector output and capital accumulation. 
Directed credit programs, a favorite instrument of African governments and international 
donors, usually target industry, state-owned enterprises, agriculture, and small and medium-
scale enterprises, adopting different forms of intervention: credit allocation rules imposed 
on banks, refinance schemes, subsidized loans, credit guarantees, and direct lending by 
Development Finance Institutions (DFis) (World Development Report 1989). Specifically, 
most targeted credit initiatives to small and medium enterprises in developing countries are 
based on the allegation that credit is the major constraint to enterprise operations and 
growth. 
However, it seems now clear that these targeted initiatives have followed the path 
of the small-farmer credit programs of the 80's, i.e., either they result in costly and 
regressive income transfers, or they are so bound by restrictions and provisions that they fail 
to meet their disbursement targets. In both cases, these targeted programs fail to attain 
their intended goals, while seriously compromising the viability of the financial intermediar-
ies acting as conduits of donor funds. Although individual sectors may have benefitted from 
directed credit, the evaluations of the effect these programs have on resource allocation is 
at best inconclusive. The connection between credit allocations and real economic activity 
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is difficult to establish. Substitution, diversion, and the fungibility of finance may render 
changes in credit totally ineffective to induce changes in real activity (Gale 1991, Von 
Pischke and Adams). 
Designing sound and "safe" donor interventions in enterprise development requires 
a thorough understanding. of the true role finance plays in firm dynamics, of the factors 
underlying liability and asset portfolio choices, and of the interactions between finance and 
the other markets and institutions comprising the firm's environment. In addition, 
interventions need to account for the effects they are likely to exert on the financial 
intermediaries operating in this environment. Hence, a clear understanding of the role and 
functioning of financial intermediation must precede the design of enterprise development 
strategies. 
The Regional Program on Enterprise Development of The World Bank (RPED) is 
concerned with the microeconomic environment in which African firms operate, with the 
"determinants and characteristics of behavior" of these micro units, and with the dynamic 
processes through which these firms interact. A major focus of the research program is the 
"impact of government regulations and the networks of markets and support institutions that 
provide the enabling environment for firm development''.2/. The role that financial 
markets, financial intermediaries, and financial regulations play in this environment is a 
central issue in the RPED research program. 
A number of questions can be formulated to guide the analysis of the role that 
finance plays in the environment surrounding African enterprises, among others: 
11 RPED. "The Dynamics of Enterprise Development in Africa: Concepts 
Paper." October 1991. 
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what are the services demanded by firms from financial intermediaries?, 
in addition to borrowed capital, what is the significance of the demand for portfolio 
management options?, for insurance substitutes?, 
what is the nature and the relative importance of the so-called "credit constraint" to 
enterprise development?, 
how does the availability (absence) of financial services affect firm activities?, 
does the choice of sources of finance affect the choice of investments by entrepre-
neurs?, 
are there significant differences across industries in the role played by the availability 
of liquidity?, ... , by the availability of borrowed funds?, 
do these inter-industry differences create "comparative advantages" among industries? 
In addition to the direct relationship between financial intermediaries and 
enterprises, it is essential to investigate the indirect effects financial markets are likely to 
have on enterprise development through non-financial support mechanisms (e.g., financing 
of marketing agents, input suppliers and other complementary businesses). Furthermore, 
regulations and incentives affecting financial intermediaries will potentially affect 
manufacturing firm operations and growth through several (direct and indirect) mechanisms. 
Typical examples are the crowding out of the private sector by public sector borrowing from 
the banking system (directly through treasury bills, and indirectly through reserve require-
ments), and the restrictions on institutional lending to trading enterprises and the service 
sector. The former reduces the total amount of institutional credit available to private 
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enterprises, while the latter restrict the ability of non-manufacturing firms to provide 
(informal) credit to manufacturing firms. 
The key conceptual elements to analyze enterprise financing are necessarily 
coincidental with those guiding the analysis of institutions. The New Institutional Economics 
approach (imperfect information, transaction costs, bounded rationality) applies to financial 
transactions and financial markets as it does to labor contracts and labor markets. The 
demand for financial services by enterprises, hence for "financial support systems", is 
analyzed below under the same general framework labor demand and demand for other 
factor services are analyzed (see section 11). Likewise, this general conceptual framework 
is valid for financial intermediaries as firms/agents operating in the same micro and macro 
environment surrounding non-financial enterprises (section III). 
Case studies of financial support mechanisms (section IV) are justified to the extent 
that the systems/mechanisms under analysis are relevant for the provision of financial 
services to enterprises. Case-study selection should include the key financial intermediaries 
servicing enterprises identified in the enterprise survey, and should consider the nature of 
the services contracted between firms and intermediaries. 
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II. THE DEMAND SIDE: DYNAMICS OF ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT AND 
FINANCIAL MARKETS 
The demand for financial services by enterprises, or more generally their participa-
tion in financial markets, can be analyzed as a problem of constrained portfolio selection 
by firm-households. Here the firm-household is seen as an entity maximizing a weighted 
sum of profit and utility, where the weight of the profit maximization objective (and 
therefore that of the utility maximization objective) ranges from 0 to 1. Purely profit-
maximizing decisions can be associated with conventional firms, while utility-maximizing 
choices will dominate among household (family) enterprises. 
Enterprises and households generate a demand for financial services through their 
asset portfolio allocation decisions, and their choices of debt instruments (their liability 
portfolio). While current production and long-term investment drive the profit maximizing 
behavior of conventional firms, both consumption and investment decisions are involved in 
the household constrained utility maximization process. 
Since a majority of the firms in the size distribution of enterprises are likely to lie 
somewhere between the pure extreme cases (conventional firm to household firm), in what 
follows the terms enterprise or firm are used to refer to this composite firm-household. 
Therefore, the firm's optimizing behavior encompasses current production, investment and 
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consumption objectives, and portfolio allocation decisions are consistent with these 
combined objectivesJ/. 
As indicated earlier, the New Institutional Economics (transaction costs) approach 
summarizes the appropriate conceptual elements to analyze enterprise finance. A significant 
departure from frictionless neoclassical economics, transaction-cost economics emphasizes 
the matching of governance structures with the attributes of transactions, as a condition for 
the efficient organization of economic activity. When markets are the relevant governance 
structure, the price mechanism is the primary driving force for resource allocation. 
However, when the costs of using the price mechanism are significant, hierarchical (intra-
firm) decisions supersede the price mechanism, and resource allocation is decided by a 
single administrative entity (Coase, Williamson, 1975). As will be clear below, portfolio 
allocation decisions (purchases and sales of financial contracts) are driven by the attributes 
or "characteristics" of transactions and financial instruments, much like other real resource 
allocation processes. 
Imperfect information and uncertainty are major sources of transaction costs, since 
contracting parties need to provide for contingencies associated with the transaction, or 
specify contract terms covering unforeseen contingencies. These "terms of governance" 
involve costs of monitoring, administration and enforcement. Providing for opportunistic 
behavior also creates transaction costs, in magnitude inversely proportional to the extent of 
uncertainty about human behavior4/. 
11 i.e., business decisions and household decisions are not separable. 
!/ See RPED. "Institutions: The Transactions Environment." 1991. 
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At the firm level, imperfect information and uncertainty constraint the entrepreneur's 
decision-makin~. At the market level, imperfect information and uncertainty condition 
the nature of contracts. A well-known example of the latter is the effect of adverse selection 
and incentive effects on credit market equilibrium (Stiglitz and Weiss), described earlier in 
the RPED "Institutions". paper. Enterprise portfolio choice under this contractual 
environment is discussed first below. The behavior of financial intermediaries in the same 
environment is the subject of a subsequent section. 
A Contractual Environment and Portfolio Choice 
Firms participate in financial markets not exclusively, or even not primarily, to obtain 
liquidity (to borrow)6/. Instead, enterprises resort to financial markets to satisfy a 
number of requirements, raising capital being one of them. Portfolio management options 
or alternatives which may enhance firm revenues and/ or reduce overall risk exposure, and 
msurance or insurance substitutes are two major motivations to engage in financial 
transactions. 
In developing countries, the absence of specialized capital and insurance markets 
makes the enterprise's choice among available financial contracts even more complex than 
in developed environments. Financial instruments and contracts, and their providers, are 
evaluated and ranked by potential users according to the extent to which they meet the 
~/ Note that bounded rationality applies to firms as it does to financial 
intermediaries, which are defined later as firms producing financial 
services. 
§./ Indeed, as it will be argued below, borrowing (debt) is not the 
preferred component of the firm's capital structure. 
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requirements indicated above, as well as the transaction costs associated with these 
instruments and contracts. Both assets and liabilities are seen as commodities endowed with 
characteristics, and the matching of these characteristics with those demanded by the firm 
will determine the firm's portfolio composition. In addition, the role some transactions may 
play as substitutes for missing contracts becomes an important consideration in portfolio 
choice]/. 
1. Asset Choice and Demand for Financial Services. 
What distinguishes cash under the mattress from a savings account in the Postal 
savings bank?, from a goat in the back yard?, from a piece of baking equipment, for the 
Nigerian baker entrepreneur? Return, liquidity, and safety, are the key asset characteristics 
by which these asset holding options can be compared. While expected return increases 
from cash to bank savings to goats to a new oven, liquidity decreases from immediate to 
none as the entrepreneur rates these asset options. Safety varies across these assets 
depending on the perceived risks associated with each asset type. Cash can be stolen or 
borrowed by dubious relatives, the government may freeze savings account balances amidst 
desperate adjustment measures, goats may fall victims to disease or theft, bakery equipment 
may break down off-warranty. 
Clearly, the array of alternative asset holdings will vary across industries, and across 
firm size-categories. Physical assets may include pure stores of value (e.g., jewelry) as well 
as productive assets. The latter may be industry-specific investments with minimal value as 
11 See Udry for a discussion of state-contingent credit transactions as 
substitutes for insurance in Nigerian villages. 
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inflation hedges (e.g., a forge), or equipment of a more general nature which also plays a 
role as store of value (e.g., trucks). Financial assets may range from bank deposits to 
informal loans to "tontine" contributions, with different rates of return and maturity 
(liquidity) conditions. Enterprises are likely to use sales on credit or consignment as a form 
of linked transaction which provides them with a financial asset (a loan) as well as cost-
reducing marketing strategy. 
A comprehensive enumeration and characterization of all alternative asset purchases 
(holdings) available to the firm is essential while modelling the firm's asset portfolio choice. 
Return (net of transaction costs), liquidity, maturity, and safety (risk) need to be measured 
or proxied to appropriately portray the firm' environment. The comprehensiveness of this 
enumeration and characterization of assets will be a function of the size and diversity of the 
sample of enterprises. The broader the range of activities, and the wider the spread of firm 
sizes, the better the description of available assets. 
Likewise, the description and measurement of the nature and "terms of governance" 
of contracts associated with the acquisition (holding) of different assets is essential to 
understand enterprise asset choices. Among these contract terms, the nature of the 
relationship between the firm and its transaction partners should provide important insights 
into the extent, quality, and symmetry of information prevailing in the relevant transactions. 
Moreover, the nature of the relationship between contracting parties will indicate the degree 
to which financial transactions may be substituting for absent markets. 
The model of asset portfolio choice outlined in the "Institutions" paper must then be 
complemented with explanatory variables measuring asset characteristics, terms of associated 
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transactions, and nature of relationship with transaction partners. Although a model of 
liability portfolio choice is set forth separately below, interactions are likely to exist between 
liability choice, particularly the choice of providers of funds, and the firm's asset choice..8/. 
Hence, the data collection effort should provide for a combined asset cum liability portfolio 
model. The questionnaire for enterprises (Appendix A) attempts to capture all data 
requirements suggested in this section. 
2. Liability Choice and Demand for Financial Services 
How do firms finance their entry, their expansion, their transformation?, what factors 
determine their choice of capital structure? These questions are a matter of concern not 
only in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also among analysts of U.S. corporations. A brief review 
of recent conceptual developments in the latter context follows. Their extension to 
enterprise financing in Africa is then proposed as a conceptual framework for the RPED 
research. 
In his 1984 presidential address to the American Finance Association, Stewart Myers 
contrasted two views about capital structure: the static tradeoff hypothesis, and the pecking 
order framework. The former states that a firm will set a target debt-to-value ratio and then 
will gradually adjust towards that target. The optimal debt ratio is determined in tum by 
a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of borrowing. The firm is supposed to substitute 
debt for equity, or viceversa, until the value of the firm is maximized. 
~/ See for example MacKie-Mason. 
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The pecking order theory postulates that firms have a preference for internal finance 
and that, if external financing is sought, firms will prefer debt over equity. In corporate 
jargon, firms "adapt their target dividend payout ratios to their investment opportunities" ... ; 
if, due to unexpected imbalances between profits and investment opportunities, intemally-
generated cash flows fall short of investment outlays, "the firm first draws down its cash 
balance or marketable securities portfolio" (Myers, p. 581). 
If external finance is required, the pecking order approach continues, "firms issue the 
safest security first. That is, they start with debt, then possibly hybrid securities such as 
convertible bonds, then perhaps equity as a last resort" (Myers, p. 581, my underlining). 
Myers goes on to show that predictions based on asymmetric information are consistent with 
the central propositions of the pecking order theory. Information asymmetries in this case 
arise from the manager's better knowledge about the firm than that of potential outside 
investors, which results in a different valuation of the firm's stock. 
More recently, information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and outside investors 
(hidden information) have been submitted as a reason for firms to rank order providers of 
funds instead of security types, while other factors determine the choice between debt and 
equity (MacK.ie-Mason). Under this approach, the information available to the providers 
of funds becomes crucial to explain firm financing decisions. 
Hybrid securities and equity markets are not likely to be available for African 
enterprises. However, the central ideas of the pecking order theory and the relevance of 
information asymmetries to the selection of a firm's capital structure are an appropriate 
conceptual framework for the analysis of enterprise portfolio choice. Two points are worth 
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emphasizing here: first, the distinction between internal and external financing, and second, 
the "safety first" principle. 
The idea of a hierarchical preference between internal and external financing bridges 
an important gap usually present in financial market research. Profitable, efficient firms 
with carefully drawn investment plans will borrow relatively less than other enterprises, since 
they will finance their investment expenditures with retained earnings. Poorly managed 
enterprises, firms with overly ambitious expansion plans, or enterprises affected by 
unforeseen shocks are more likely to acquire debt. 
The "safety first" idea ruling external financing predicts that the enterprise will seek 
risky debt (e.g., collateralized loans), only after all sources of soft, state-contingent loans are 
exhausted. Borrowing that exposes the firm to enforceable foreclosure of collateral, 
amounts to the relinquishing of ownership involved in selling stock. Observed debt 
contracts, therefore, will vary across firms in terms of the borrower's risk exposure, 
depending on the firms total indebtedness, and on the information available to the lender 
about the borrower's condition. 
Finally, once external borrowing becomes necessary, a key question is the ability of 
enterprises to pledge collateral. Enterprises facing low-risk investments will reduce overall 
borrowing costs if they can "show" their low risk by offering collateral (Bester, Gale 1990a). 
The inability to pledge loan guarantees consistent with the firm's perceived production risks 
makes them susceptible to "undeserved" credit rationing, and induces lenders to allocate 
funds to higher risk ventures. Collateral and collateral substitutes are key issues in the 
analysis of enterprise liability portfolios. 
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B. Model of Liability Portfolio Choice 
The empirical analysis of enterprise liability portfolio starts, in a way akin to the asset 
choice problem, with a comprehensive enumeration and characterization of available debt 
instruments. Debt terms and conditions (which are at the same time the contract terms) 
need to be carefully documented: interest charges, non-interest transaction costs, maturity, 
and collateral. Informal loan transactions, specially linked transactions, pose particular 
measurement difficulties that need to be accounted for and overcome. 
As was the case with assets, the profiles of available debt contracts will be as 
comprehensive as the heterogeneity of the enterprise sample permits. Sufficient variation 
in contract terms will allow the identification and measurement of tradeoffs between 
contract characteristics, notably interest charges and collateral. Furthermore, a sizeable and 
heterogeneous sample would permit the distinction and characterization of different sources 
of finance by the terms of contracts they offer. 
The dependent variables in a model of liability portfolio are the shares of different 
debt balances in the enterprise's portfolio. Formal loans from banks and non-bank financial 
institutions, loans from credit unions or other cooperative financing entities, informal loans 
from commercial moneylenders, from informal groups, or from relatives and friends, are 
likely to comprise the debt portfolio of enterprises. Their relative portfolio shares will vary 
across enterprises as a function of firm specific, activity (industry) specific, and environmen-
tal factors. 
Firm specific factors are represented by explanatory variables such as scale, 
availability of family labor, managerial capacity, and characteristics of the associated 
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household. Activity specific variables capture the differences in production cycle, and the 
characteristics of input and output markets associated with the industry (e.g., terms of trade, 
unionization). Environmental factors are associated with regulations and distortions not 
specific of a particular industry, such as the density of financial intermediaries in the area 
of activity of the firm. The characteristics of, and the extent of information shared with, 
different providers of funds could be classified under environmental factors. Several proxies 
for the nature and quality of this relationship are included in the questionnaire for 
enterprises (Appendix A). 
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III. THE SUPPLY SIDE: 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
The analysis of the demand side discussed in the preceding chapter will produce a 
comprehensive profile of financial services effectively used by enterprises. The enterprise 
questionnaire (Appendix A) will document in detail the characteristics of financial assets 
purchased by these enterprises, as well as the terms and conditions of contracts associated 
with the acquisition and holding of these assets. Likewise, the composition of the liability 
portfolio, the characteristics of debt instruments acquired by enterprises from different 
financial intermediaries, and the terms and conditions of these loan contracts, will provide 
a clear indication of the relative importance of different sources of funds, and of the 
determinants of liability choice among these enterprises. 
The analysis of the supply side attempts to respond two sets of questions. The first 
set of questions has to do with the matching of financial services offered by intermediaries 
versus those used (purchased) by enterprises: how do financial services effectively used by 
(manufacturing) enterprises compare against the range of financial services offered by 
financial intermediaries?; are enterprises rationed out of certain types of loan contracts?; 
is there a sufficiently diverse range of financial instruments available in the market to allow 
enterprises effective portfolio management?; if so, is the entire range accessible to all 
firms?. 
The second group of questions relates more directly to the financial intermediaries 
and their transactions environment: what characterizes the asset and liability portfolio of 
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financial intermediaries?; what determines the intermediaries' portfolio decisions?; what 
are their rationing criteria to allocate instruments and contracts in excess demand?; how 
is the enterprise (manufacturing) sector perceived by different intermediaries vis a vis other 
sectors of their clientele?. On the other hand, what exogenous (environmental) factors 
condition the behavior of financial intermediaries?; what macro and financial regulations 
constrain the ability of these intermediaries to offer improved contracts to their clients?, to 
manufacturing enterprises?. 
This chapter presents first an overview of financial services and financial intermediar-
ies prevailing in Sub-Saharan Africa. This overview section submits a set of issues and 
questions to guide the RPED research in this area. Subsequently, a conceptual framework 
to approach these issues and questions is developed in this chapter, before proposing criteria 
for case study selection and research methods in the final chapter of the paper. 
A. Overview of Financial Intermediation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
A brief review of the status of financial market development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
is presented here, emphasizing the characteristics that distinguish the region from other 
developing areas. The relative underdevelopment of formal finance, and the relative 
importance of informal and semi-formal intermediaries provide a basis for the definition of 
issues and questions in the second part of this section. Central among these, are the issue 
of regulatory policies and government crowding out affecting financial intermediation, and 
the question of integration and complementarity between formal, semi-formal, and informal 
finance in this institutional environment. 
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1. Financial Services and Financial Intermediaries 
Institutional finance is notoriously underdeveloped in Sub-Saharan Africa as 
compared to other developing regions. While developing countries in Latin America and 
Asia show bank density ratios in the order of 8 to 30 thousand inhabitants per bank agency, 
the typical ratios for Sub-Saharan countries range from 100 to 420 thousand inhabitants per 
bank agen~. Moreover, as will be discussed below, bank expansion is constrained by 
a number of factors, notably the absence of appropriate legal frameworks for the negotiation 
and enforcement of contracts, the financial regulations discouraging deposit mobilization and 
portfolio growth, inflation, exchange rate uncertainty, and foreign currency controls. The 
poor conditions of transportation and communications, and the low levels of literacy of 
prospective clienteles compound the restrictions to formal finance development. 
Special projects aimed at financing small and medium enterprises do not differ 
significantly in their performance to that of African financial institutions in general. A 
review of World Bank lending to small and medium enterprises between 1973 and 1988 
found the lowest subloan repayment rates in Africa (61 percent), with specially poor 
performance in projects intermediated by development finance institutions (DFis)lO/. 
As a consequence of the underdevelopment of the formal financial system, informal 
finance is more prevalent in Africa than in other developing areas, both in terms of the 
relative number of households and enterprises using informal financial services, as well as 
in terms of the amounts of liquidity circulating in the informal market compared to the 
~/ There is a few exceptions with better bank density ratios, e.g., Togo, 
Zimbabwe. 
10/ See Webster. 
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banking sector. Furthermore, informal financial intermediaries appear to succeed where 
formal financial institutions have failed. 
Loan recovery rates and financial viability are high among informal lenders, while 
banks and DFis show poor loan repayment rates, and require permanent subsidies and/ or 
periodic recapitalization by the government or international donors to avoid financial 
collapse. Substantial amounts of voluntary savings circulate among informal groups and 
other informal intermediaries offering safekeeping and deposit services, while formal 
institutions show limited success in mobilizing depositsll/. 
Along with the apparent dominance and success of informal finance, several semi-
formal forms of intermediation display successful records in Africa that they have not 
attained elsewhere. The credit union networks in Cameroon and Togo, for example, have 
performed better than their counterparts in Latin America in the late 80s, and certainly 
better than the banking systems in their respective countries. 
No comprehensive study (to my knowledge) has been undertaken of the portfolio 
composition of financial intermediaries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This in spite of the credit 
allocation policies that prevail in most countries, that typically establish overall lending 
ceilings and minimum portfolio shares for preferential sectors such as agriculture or small 
and medium-size enterprises. A widespread impression is that these credit allocation 
practices are for the most part ineffective due to weak enforcement procedures, and to the 
ability of financial institutions to circumvent the regulation. Furthermore, semi-formal and 
informal intermediaries are not subject to these credit controls. As a consequence, beyond 
11/ For a recent comprehensive review of informal finance see Adams and 
Fitchett. 
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the public/private split of domestic credit statistics, the sectoral distribution of institutional 
credit reported by Central Banlcs in the region is at best a biased estimate of the true 
domestic credit allocation among sectors of economic activity. 
The extent to which semi-formal and informal intermediaries represent a significant 
source of financial services for enterprises is for the most part unknown. The RPED 
enterprise survey will certainly improve the available evidence in this areaJY. From the 
point of view of the analysis of financial support systems, the prevalence of the non-
institutional sector calls for a careful appraisal of the potential of these intermediaries to 
perform a complementary role to formal finance in the provision of financial services to 
enterprises. The issue of market integration, market segmentation, and formal-informal 
communication becomes a particularly important topic of analysis. 
2. Issues and Questions 
A first set of issues the RPED project will investigate is the legal and regulatmy 
framework comprising the environment of financial institutions. The legal structure, notably 
the system of property rights, and the credibility of law enforcement constitute crucial 
elements of the contractual environment under which banks operate. Macroeconomic and 
financial regulations condition the scale of operations, and the portfolio decisions of 
financial institutions. 
Although informal and semi-formal finance may perform better as intermediaries of 
the existing liquidity in the private sector, they are not able to "create" aggregate additional 
12/ See Adams and Fitchett. 
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liquidity potentially available for enterprises and households. The ultimate competitor of 
private enterprises in the allocation of domestic credit is the public sector (i.e., the 
government, and the non-government public institutions). Hence, an important issue to 
investigate is the degree of crowding out exercised by governments, both through their 
interference in Central Bank policies and practices (primarily reserve requirements and 
discount rates), and through the direct incentives and signals issued by the Treasury. 
Interest rate policies and credit controls need to be documented as well, keeping in 
mind the caveat formulated above about enforcement and avoidance of these two types of 
policies. More interesting and reliable information is likely to be obtained directly from the 
financial institutions (provided that there is reasonable access to their records). 
Akin to the study of the legal and regulatory framework for financial institutions, is 
the research of rules and bylaws governing semi-formal financial institutions such as credit 
cooperatives and credit unions. Likewise, the contractual rules associated with informal 
financial transactions need to be documented for those agents relevant to enterprise 
financing, enterprise portfolio management, and enterprise risk management13/. 
The second set of issues and questions to guide RPED field research is that of 
market integration between formal, semi-formal, and informal financial intermediaries. 
Each type of financial intermediary offers advantages and limitations when dealing with 
different segments of the market. The informational advantages of informal intermediaries, 
and to some extent of semi-formal intermediaries, make these intermediaries effective 
13/ The legal and regulatory framework relevant to formal, and possibly semi-
formal, financial institutions could be a component of the RPED country 
background studies. For informal intermediaries, a survey parallel to 
that of enterprises is preferable (see Chapter IV). 
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lenders among low-income, low-collateral borrowers. Their reliability as sources of funds 
however, depends to a large extent of their ability to raise liquidity in their own businesses 
or elsewhere. Hoe fluid is the access to formal credit by informal intermediaries is a key 
question in this respect. 
Large enterprises and traders, well connected with the banking sector and able to 
pledge collateral acceptable to banks and other financial institutions, have been found to 
perform a complementary role to formal finance by lending informally to clients and 
suppliers14/. The significance of this role in the countries included in the RPED study, 
and more importantly the constraints and limitations in the performance of this function, 
need to be carefully assessed. 
On the other hand, the services offered by credit unions and informal groups must 
be documented. A primary concern here is the degree of integration, through the market, 
across these intermediaries, and between them and the formal sector. The ability of these 
informal and semi-formal intermediaries to effectively use the formal sector for their own 
portfolio management crucially determines their capacity to offer portfolio management 
options to enterprises. 
B. Imperfect Information, Transaction Costs and Financial Intermediation 
The diversity of financial intermediaries operating in the enterprises' environment 
represents a challenge to the selection of a conceptual approach for their analysis. The 
nature of this diversity, the common grounds still remaining among financial intermediaries, 
14/ See Cook, Cuevas, and Graham on grain and livestock traders in Chad and 
Niger, and Graham et al on Niger wholesalers. 
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and their repercussions on portfolio decisions, market integration, and response to 
regulations are discussed first in this section. The conceptual elements on the specially 
relevant issues of imperfect information, credit rationing and the role of collateral are 
presented in the final part of this chapter. 
1. Diversity of Financial Intermediaries and Portfolio Choice 
From modem branches of European banks to "susu" collectors, financial intermediar-
ies differ substantially in their behavior' and performance. Hence, behavioral assumptions, 
analytical models, and performance indicators used in their analysis must recognize and 
account for this diversity. In addition to the usual classification into formal, semi-formal, 
and informal intermediaries, based primarily on their exposure to regulation, the distinction 
between market-driven versus government-directed has a bearing in the expected behavior 
and performance of intermediaries. 
As a general approach, the treatment of financial institutions as firms using real 
resources to produce outputs (financial services) is generally accepted and has been regular 
practice in the analysis of banks (Baltensperger, 1980, Benston and Smith, Hunter and 
Timme). The approach has been extended to credit unions by Murray and White and 
others in developed countries. Competitive approaches appear in the study of credit unions 
and specially in the analysis of informal financial groups, where collective action and the 
theory of clubs offer alternative analytical routes to that of production theory. The study 
of individual informal intermediaries faces further complexities, since the goals and 
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objectives of their primary business activities and households interact with their role as 
financial intermediaries. 
Perhaps the most significant differences across financial intermediaries appear in 
their objective functions (or in the objective functions analysts can plausibly attach to 
different intermediaries). While the theory of the banking firm is applicable to both private 
commercial banks and public development banks, profit maximization is a clearly debatable 
objective for public banks. Equity and developmental goals, or managerial objectives 
compete with profit as optimization functions in public financial institutions. 
Likewise, the very definition of credit unions as not-for-profit organizations rules out 
the profit maximization assumption in their analysis. Instead, the maximization of net 
surplus to members under zero profit and balance sheet constraints has been suggested as 
a more appropriate model of credit union behavior, raising the issue of borrower versus 
depositor domination in these organizations (Smith). 
Informal financial groups have been studied little beyond the descriptive stage. 
Among other analytical approaches (e.g., linked transactions, transaction costs) the theory 
of clubs offers a promising framework for the analysis of these organizations. Voluntary 
participation, cost-sharing in the provision of the "impure public good", the fund, and sharing 
members' characteristics in multi-lateral reciprocal transactions of tangible and intangible 
commodities, are features of informal groups that conform to the general definition of clubs 
(Sandler and Tschirhart). 
A common model applied to both banks and credit unions that circumvents the 
question of what to maximize is cost minimization. The underlying assumption here is that 
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no matter what is being maximized, cost minimization behavior will yield more surplus to 
be appropriated by someone, hence this behavior is preferred to an alternative cost strategy. 
This general approach can be extended to all financial intermediaries, as long as the 
diversities in costs magnitudes and structure are recognized. 
The RPED research effort will identify a priori three types of intermediaries as 
potentially relevant for manufacturing enterprises: (a) in the formal sector, banks (private 
and public); (b), in the semi-formal sector, credit unions and similar cooperative financial 
organizations; and (c), large enterprises and traders, among informal financial intermediar-
ies. The latter will be given special attention since they are potentially a better point of 
intervention for policy makers than other forms of informal intermediation. Evidence from 
Latin American and Asian informal markets suggests that small and medium enterprise 
access to credit relies heavily upon the activity of large enterprises and traders. The 
limitations faced by these agents in Africa are of particular significance for the objectives 
of this research program. 
Informal financial groups such as rotating savings and credit associations ('tontines' 
in francophone Africa) will be studied to the extent they are detected as significant 
providers of financial services in the survey of enterprises. Likewise, individual intermediar-
ies such as moneykeepers or "susu" collectors can be subjects of case studies where their 
activities are deemed meaningful. 
All three types of intermediaries are assumed to behave in a "boundedly rational" 
way, subject to information imperfections and uncertainty. In all cases, transaction costs of 
acquiring information about contractual partners are a major determinant of their portfolio 
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composition (of assets and liabilities), and a key factor in explaining market shares. 
Although technically only formal institutions are subject to monetary and financial 
regulations, other financial intermediaries (and therefore overall financial intermediation) 
are affected by regulations in varying degrees and with different time lags. The extent to 
which economic agents participate in more than one market will affect the extent, accuracy 
and speed of transmission of regulatory measures. 
Portfolio choice is again the keyword in this component of RPED research. 
Documenting the magnitude and composition of the intermediaries' asset and liability 
portfolios is required to answer three groups of questions. First, how do enterprises enter 
the asset and liability portfolio of financial intermediaries, i.e., the question of provision of 
loan services, portfolio management alternatives, and insurance substitutes to manufacturing 
enterprises. 
Second, documenting how financial intermediaries participate m each others' 
portfolios addresses the question of financial market integration. Regular business (market) 
relationships across financial intermediaries enhance overall diversification, and improve the 
range of available financial contracts to all participants. Conversely, total isolation implies 
that the intermediary is restricted by the covariance of surpluses of its clientele, and exposed 
to the same exogenous shocks these clients face. 
Finally, it is essential to know how regulators and regulations enter and affect the 
portfolio of financial intermediaries. How do reserve requirements alter the asset portfolio 
of commercial banks?; to what extent subsidized discount rates discourage deposit 
mobilization?. Answering these and the preceding two groups of questions responds to the 
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general question of regulation transmission from formal to less-formal sectors of the 
financial market. 
In addition to documenting and analyzing the intermediaries' portfolio structure, it 
is essential to enumerate and characterize the instruments and contracts offered by different 
financial intermediaries, i.e., the terms and conditions of transactions associated with the 
various components of their asset and liability portfolios. As indicated above, it is important 
to determine whether the range of contracts offered by intermediaries matches that of 
contracts observed among (used by) enterprises. Departures of the latter from the general 
pattern of contracts offered will reflect either intermediaries' specialization in certain 
clientele, or rationing of enterprises our of particular contracts, both of these phenomena 
worth investigating further. 
This "pricing" question is also a key indicator of the existing degree of market integra-
tion. Other things being equal, terms and conditions of comparable contracts offered by 
different intermediaries will overlap in their distributions if the market is sufficiently integrated. 
2. Information Costs, Credit Rationing, and Collateral 
Information costs have been already highlighted in the RPED "Institutions" paper as 
essential determinants of credit rationing: ... "financial institutions tend to group firms into 
categories based on the amount of information available on their performance and the 
probability of business failure" ... , since the costs of distinguishing individual firms from the 
group average are prohibitive for banks, "the 'best' small firms will be discriminated against 
statistically by lenders" (RPED, "Institutions" paper, page 41). A brief review of credit 
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rationing is added here to emphasize the role of collateral, and the importance of 
documenting collateral and collateral substitutes in the analysis of enterprise credit 
transactions. 
Several definitions of credit rationing are offered in the literature. Credit rationing 
is said to occur when some borrowers receive a loan and others do not, although the latter 
would accept higher interest payments or an increase in collateral (Stiglitz and Weiss). 
Alternatively, credit rationing occurs when lenders quote an interest rate on loans and then 
proceed to sm:wly a smaller loan size than demanded by the borrower (Jaffee and Russell). 
Apart from the rather straightforward case of credit rationing due to constraints on 
price setting (disequilibrium rationing caused by government intervention), equilibrium 
rationing has been modeled by Stiglitz and Weiss, and Bester, among others. All of these 
models assume imperfect and asymmetric information in the credit market, and some form 
of price-setting behavior by lenders. Recent work by Gale (1990a, 1990b, and 1991) has 
applied this framework to the analysis of government intervention in credit markets. 
In the Stiglitz and Weiss model, the interest rate a bank charges may affect the 
riskiness of the pool of loans a bank makes by : (a), sorting potential borrowers (the adverse 
selection effect), and/or (b), affecting the actions of borrowers (the incentive effect). The 
former implies that only borrowers with riskier investments will apply for a loan at a higher 
interest rate (i.e., the share of riskier or potentially "dishonest" borrowers in the pool of 
borrowers increase), while the latter suggests that firms are induced to undertake projects 
with higher-but-less-probable payoffs, i.e, with lower expected return. 
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As a consequence of the adverse selection and incentive effects, the expected (mean) 
return on loans to the bank is a concave function of the interest rate charged on loans. 
While loan supply responds to the mean return on loans to lenders, loan demand is a 
function of the interest rate on loans faced by borrowers. In equilibrium, some borrowers 
will be rationed out even though they are willing to pay above-equilibrium interest 
rates.15./. 
Bester on the other hand, states that "no credit rationing will occur in equilibrium if 
banks compete by choosing collateral requirements and the rate of interest to screen 
investors' riskiness" (Bester, p. 850), based on the assumption that banks' decisions on 
interest rate and collateral are simultaneous. 
Two other important assumptions condition Bester's model: first, that low-risk 
borrowers are "able to raise sufficient collateral to distinguish themselves from high risk 
ones" (Bester, p. 854); second, not explicit in Bester's article, is the assumption that banks 
can freely adjust the interest rate on loan contracts, to offer different combinations of 
interest and collateral. 
Exogenous factors can (and do) violate these two basic assumptions in rural areas of 
developing economies. On the one hand, restrictions on the resource endowment of 
"honest" borrowers may not allow them to reveal their low-riskiness through offering 
sufficient collateral, (i.e., the small-farmer/micro-entrepreneur syndrome). On the other 
15 / As Biggs has correctly pointed out elsewhere, no empirical evidence has confirmed 
the predictions of this model. 
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hand, financial regulations usually constrain the range of (explicit) interest-rates that banks 
can charge on loans. 
Under these constraints, lenders establish mechanisms and procedures to allow for 
collateral substitutes, (e.g., additional information and/ or inter-linked contracts), and engage 
in "regulatory avoidance" or implicit-price setting (Kane), to compensate for the restrictions 
on loan-rate differentiation. This involves the discriminatory application of loan procedures, 
i.e., the selective imposition of transaction costs, as substitutes for explicit-interest rate 
differentiation between borrowers of different riskiness. Thus, transaction costs (implicit 
pricing) become an important rationing mechanism under interest-rate restrictions. 
The survey of financial support mechanisms must place special emphasis in the 
analysis of the role of collateral in credit transactions, as well as in the effects of regulations 
on the valuation and enforceability of loan guarantees. These issues are not only important 
to understand enterprise access to liquidity. More importantly, they offer a potential 
''window of intervention" for governments and donors, that would not compromise the 
viability of financial intermediaries. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT MECHANISMS 
Financial intermediaries comprising the environment of enterprises should be 
surveyed contemporaneously with the sample of enterprises, and as many times as enterprise 
surveys are carried out. The advantages of gathering longitudinal data for the analysis of 
enterprise behavior apply as well to the analysis of enterprise financing and intermediaries' 
behavior. 
Although the study of financial support mechanisms has been conceived as case 
studies, as opposed to representative sample surveys, the relative scarcity of some 
intermediaries will make the scope of this component of RPED research necessarily 
comprehensive. Opportunities for relatively advanced analytical techniques may arise by 
pooling data across countries and/ or over time. 
The diversity of financial intermediaries RPED is likely to find in the countries under 
analysis does not allow a detailed formulation of research methods and data collection 
strategies at this stage. A preliminary assessment of the spectrum of intermediaries, their 
scope of operations, and specially their record-keeping practices and procedures is required 
before detailed instruments and techniques can be designed. Hence, this chapter provides 
necessarily general guidelines for case study selection, as well as methodological indications 
that should be followed in all countries. Likewise, the questionnaires and data collection 
instruments outlined in Appendix B are intended to provide a framework that needs to be 
adjusted to each country's situation. 
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A Case Selection Criteria 
The most important signal to select financial intermediaries for detailed case studies 
will be their identification in the survey of enterprises as suppliers of financial services. 
However, the sparsity of formal financial institutions in African countries allows to pre-
determine the need to survey all formal financial institutions operating in the relevant 
enterprise environment, regardless of whether they have appeared as suppliers of financial 
services for the enterprises in the sample. 
In most cases, a similar criterion can be applied to semi-formal intermediaries, to the 
extent that these are registered with some government institution or local (national) 
association. In other words, once a geographic area has been chosen for the enterprise 
survey, all formal and semi-formal financial intermediaries operating in the area are targeted 
for case studies. 
Since there is no sample frame for informal intermediaries, their identification relies 
upon the responses to the enterprise survey. As pointed out above, large enterprises and 
traders (wholesalers) will receive particular attention among informal intermediaries. These 
case studies will be selected so that they are representative of the diverse areas of economic 
activity prevailing in the sample of enterprises. In addition, well-known wholesalers, 
marketing and processing firms may be selected for case studies when secondary information 
identified them as actual or potential financial intermediaries. 
For large enterprises and traders, in addition to applying first the enterprise survey 
questionnaire set forth in Appendix A, supplementary interviews and data gathering will 
be conditional upon the findings of this first interview. The design of this questionnaire, 
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focusing on the nature of contractual relationships with suppliers and clients, and on access 
to formal and informal financial intermediaries, permits the identification of specific lines 
of commercial activity where explicit or implicit credit components are significant. 
B. Methods and Data. 
For all intermediaries, case studies will combine data collection from intermediaries 
records with semi-structured interviews. The latter will focus on adding detail to the data 
collected from their records, specially in two areas: characteristics of contracting 
counterparts, and terms and conditions of transactions16/. 
Case studies of financial intermediaries should be carried out by well-prepared junior 
researchers, with a clear understanding of the objectives and directions set forth earlier in 
this paper. Bank branch managers, credit union leaders and managers, and specially large 
entrepreneurs and traders are likely to be reluctant to disclose sensitive information to 
young, however enthusiastic, enumerators. Field supervisors in the enterprise survey may 
be appropriate interviewers for financial intermediaries, while selected enumerators may 
participate in the collection of data from intermediaries records, once the case study subject 
has agreed to provide the hµormation. 
Questionnaires and data collection instruments for banks, credit unions, and large 
enterprises and traders are outlined in Appendix B. When collecting data from records, 
event though the variables being documented will be consistent across intermediaries, the 
19../ For large enterprises and traders, most of these data will have been gathered in the 
first interview using the questionnaire in Appendix A. 
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specific data collection forms should follow the way in which records are kept in the 
institution or organization. This not only economizes time and effort in data gathering but 
also prevents errors of adjusting the information from the intermediaries' records to fir pre-
established forms. Compatibilization of data series is better done afterwards, provided that 
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Table 1 
Selected Growth Indicators for Developing Countries 
Average amual growth rates 1980-1989, 
COU'\try Gr~ GNP per Gross GDP Agri- Indus-




Africa -1.2 -3.9 2.1 2.0 0.7 
East Asia 6.3 9.9 7.9 5.2 10.4 
South Asia 2.9 4.1 5.1 2.9 6.7 
Latin America & -0.5 -2.3 1.6 1.9 1.6 
the Caribbean 
I World I 1.2 I 3.7 I 3.1 I 2.6 I 2.4 
Source: World Bank. World Development Report 1991. 
b 
Manufacture is part of the industrial sector. 








I 3.7 I 3.2 I 
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Table 2 
Structure of Production in Developing Countries, 1965 and 1989 
Distribution of Gross Domestic Product, cercent 
COU'ltry Group Agriculture Industry Manufacture• Servicesb 
1965 . 1989 1965 1989 1965 1989 1965 1989 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 41 32 20 27 8 11 39 38 
East Asia 42 24 35 44 27 33 23 34 
South Asia 44 32 21 26 15 17 35 41 
Latin America & 16 17 33 33 23 22 51 50 
the Caribbean° 
II World 10 na 40 na 30 na 51 na 
Source: World Bank. World Development Report 1991. 
b 
c 
Manufacture is part of the industrial sector. 
Services include unallocated items. 
Estimated for 1989. 
Table 3 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Gross Domestic Product, Gross Domestic Investment, 
and Official Development Assistance, 1980 and 1985-1989 
Indicator 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
billions of dollars 
Gross Domestic Product 225 198 168 151 164 171 
Gross Domestic Investment 45 24 25 24 26 26 
Official Dev. Assistance 9 11 12 14 13 
Source: World Bank. World Development Report 1991. 

